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Introduction
There is a long-standing debate about the advantages and disadvantages of foreign investors.
Advocates emphasize the benefits of foreign capital, expertise and networks, whereas critics worry about hollowing out domestic economic activities. This debate also pertains to the financing of start-ups by venture capitalists (VCs). The US is the epicentre of the venture capital (VC) industry, and in recent decades US VCs have taken an increased interested in global investment opportunities (Aizenman and Kendall, 2012) . Policy makers in many countries therefore face the question of whether or not to encourage foreign VC investments, especially from the US (Bradley et al., 2011) .
Of primary concern to most policy makers is the question of employment creation, which is typically the main reason of looking at VC in the first place (Davis et al., 2014; Samila and Sorenson, 2011) . In addition, there is also an interest in business activity, typically measured through sales growth. Finally, there is a concern about exit, especially whether acquirers are domestic or foreign. All these policy issues ultimately come down to some factual questions: whether foreign VCs have a different impact than domestic VCs? In this paper we set out to provide empirical evidence about the differential effects of foreign VC investments. We specifically evaluate the main criticism about foreign VCs, that they care less about the domestic growth of the companies they invest in.
To focus our research question, we consider the investments of US VCs in Sweden. We focus on US investors, because the US has the largest and most mature VC market and is the most powerful source of foreign VC investments. We have several reasons for looking at Sweden. First, it is one of the most developed VC markets, always ranked among the top 10 countries in terms of VC to GDP ratio (OECD, 2017) . We are therefore dealing with an institutional environment that is mature and has credible domestic VCs as an alternative to US VCs. Second, Sweden has high-quality data, including detailed data on employment and sales of all private companies. We are therefore able to measure the effect of US VCs with great precision. Lerner and Tåg (2013) provide a detailed description of institutional details of the Swedish VC market.
It should be mentioned upfront that our analysis only looks at the activities of Swedish startup companies in Sweden. Our data sources cannot measure their activities outside of Sweden, so we cannot observe employment creation in the US (or elsewhere outside Sweden). We may well be underestimating the total growth effect of US VCs on Swedish companies. However, our interest here is specifically on the domestic growth of Swedish start-ups, which is the 3 central concern for policy makers, and which our data covers accurately. Note also that our data contains one indirect measure of moving activity abroad, namely whether Swedish companies establish foreign subsidiaries or not.
All employment and sales data come from the Swedish Companies Registrations Office. The VC data on investments and exits come from Thompson One. Our sample covers the period 1998 to 2012. The main regression models consider the effect of US VC investments on company growth (such as employment and sales) over the subsequent five years. The analysis naturally controls for other factors, such as company industry, location, and stage, as well as calendar time and economic cycles. We also consider the effect of US VC investments on subsequent fundraising and exit.
Endogeneity is a central concern, as the investments of US VCs should not be treated as exogenous. Our analysis combines two well-established instrumental variable approaches.
First, we consider supply shocks to the VC industry in the US. From the perspective of Sweden these are exogenous, as investment opportunities in Sweden are unlikely to drive US VC fundraising. Moreover, we control for US and Swedish GDP growth, so as to account for relevant macro-economic shocks. This approach is similar to Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013).
Second, we consider local market conditions, using the instrumental variable methods of Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) . This approach leverages VC supply shocks to local markets, defined by industries and local geographies. Our instruments are highly significant in the firststage regression that predict the presence of US VCs and pass all the standard specification tests.
Our main results are as follows. We find a strong positive employment effect for companies backed by US VCs, both in the simple OLS and in the instrumented 2SLS regressions. The effects are economically large and increase over time. We obtain a similar set of results for company sales. There is evidence for an increase in profitability and the presence of foreign subsidiaries in the long-run. We also find receiving funding from a US VC increases the likelihood of raising additional rounds of financing. However, we do not find any statistically significant effect of US VC on the probability of exit. Most surprising, we do not find that having US VCs increases the likelihood of US exits, such as getting acquired by a US company or listing on a US stock exchange. We perform a variety of robustness checks and find that our core results are very stable. 4 This paper adds to the growing literature on the role of VC for economic growth. The work of Decker et al. (2014) establishes the importance of young high-growth companies for economywide employment creation. The work of Chemmanur et al. (2011) , Puri and Zarutskie (2012) , and Samila and Sorenson (2011) relate VC financing to economic growth. Our contribution here is to ask whether domestic versus foreign VCs have differential growth impacts. This provides a link to the literature on cross-border VC investing. Prior work looks at the determinants and consequences of foreign VC investments, notable contributions include Bottazzi et al. (2016 ), Chemmanur et al. (2016 , Dai et al. (2012) , Devigne et al. (2016 Devigne et al. ( , 2018 , Humphery-Jenner and Suchard (2013), and Nahata et al. (2014) . Our contribution to this literature is two-fold. First, we focus on the aspect of employment creation using census-level data, which is the most reliable data source for this purpose. Second, we pay close attention to endogeneity and propose a novel set of instruments that has not been used in this context before.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the data, Section 2 the empirical approach. Section 3 reports the main results from the VC sample, whereas Section 4 features several extensions and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Data

Sources and variable construction
The data set comprises a panel of all Swedish limited liability companies between 1998 and 2012. Our focus is on a subset that tracks companies from their first VC investment until exit, which we refer to as VC sample. For more on the institutional details of the Swedish VC market, see Lerner and Tåg (2013) for a comprehensive description. The data comes from the following sources.
Swedish Companies Registrations Office. Company level data for the period 1998 to 2012 comes from the Swedish Companies Registrations Office (SCRO). The SCRO is a government entity that keeps track of all limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and private.
Swedish law requires all limited-liability companies to submit annual accounts to the SCRO 1 .
Companies with majority ownership of subsidiaries are required to file information on the corporate group structure. Company level data is therefore adjusted to account for subsidiaries, when they are present. In addition to accounting information, the SCRO has data on mergers, in the empirical analysis. 
Descriptive statistics
Empirical approach
The empirical analysis uses two panel regression models to study the effect of US VC investment on Swedish companies. The following is the base line OLS model specification: 
Main Results from the VC sample
Employment and pay results
Panel A of Table 5 shows that there is a strong positive employment effect in the base line OLS model. 3 Coefficients for USVC over one-to four-year horizons are all highly statistically significant (p-values < 0.01), with effects ranging from 28% to 35% (columns 1 to 4). The median number of employees is 13, which implies an increase of 4 to 5 employees. The effect becomes marginally insignificant at the five-year horizon. Controlling for endogeneity, the effect sizes are significantly larger in the 2SLS model. All coefficients are highly significant (p-values < 0.01), and the coefficients are larger. This might be partly due to any remaining weaknesses in the instruments, but also suggests that not controlling for endogeneity risks understates the effect of USVC on employment. Interestingly, the coefficient of USVC grows over in time, implying that USVC investment builds over time.
Panel B of Table 5 shows a negative average pay effect in the base line OLS model.
Coefficients on USVC are significant on one-to three-year horizons (p-value < 0.05), with the effect becoming weaker over a four-year horizon (p-value < 0.1) and insignificant over a fiveyear horizon. This seems to suggest that average pay decreases following USVC investment.
However, all coefficients on USVC are insignificant in the 2SLS specification. There is no effect of USVC on average pay after controlling for endogeneity.
Panel C of Table 5 suggests that unlike with average pay, there is no effect on managerial pay in the OLS model. All coefficients on USVC are insignificant. In the 2SLS model, however, there is a positive effect over three-to five-year horizons. It should be noted that the managerial pay variable captures total salaries (excluding bonuses) to the board and CEO. The effect of USVC on managerial pay could therefore be caused by an increase in salaries to individual managers and board members or an increase in the number of managers and board members, or a combination of both. For example, it is conceivable that US VC investors strive to replace individual board members or the CEO and increase the position's salary to attract better talent.
It is also possible that US VC investors increase the board size by demanding representation on the board or by bringing in additional outside directors. Unfortunately, we do not observe the number of managers and board members and are therefore unable to disentangle these effects.
Sales, profitability, and foreign subsidiaries results
Panel A of Table 6 shows that there are no significant effects of US VC investments on sales.
The OLS regressions yield a weak positive effect with a marginally significant coefficient (pvalue < 0.1) over a three-year horizon. However, after instrumentation we find a positive and statistically significant effect. Panel B of Table 6 looks at profitability. The OLS model suggests a negative short-term effect, however, the 2SLS specification yields a positive longterm effect. Following US VC investment, there is a significant increase in profitability over a three-to five-year horizon. Panel C of Table 6 
New funding round, exit, and failure results
Panel A of Table 7 finds a weak positive effect on new funding round in the OLS model.
Companies that receive US VC investment are 8-10% more likely to have an additional funding round over the next five years. With an unconditional probability of having a new funding round of 28.4%, this implies an increase of 31.7%. However, the effect disappears when controlling for endogeneity. This seems to suggest that funding rounds cluster in time for endogenous reasons. Panel B of Table 7 shows no exit effects. Neither the OLS nor the 2SLS regressions yield significant results. Thus, receiving US VC investment does not affect the probability of an exit over a five-year horizon. Panel C of Table 7 provides some evidence for a negative effect of receiving US VC investment on failure. The OLS model shows that companies that receive US VC investment are 3.7% less likely to fail over the next four years.
This effect is economically large considering the unconditional probability of failure is 0.25%.
This result holds when controlling for endogeneity in the 2SLS specification, which suggests that US VCs do not merely invest in companies that are less likely to fail ex ante.
Public policy makers are often particularly concerned about foreign exits, i.e., the possibility that foreign investors eventually sell the companies to foreign acquirers or list them on foreign exchanges. We therefore reran Panel B using only foreign exits as the dependent variable.
Again, we find no positive significant effects of USVC on the probability of foreign exit (Table   A4 ), in fact some of the coefficients are negative and significant. For completeness we also reran Panel A using only foreign new investments as the dependent variable and found very similar results.
To summarize, we do not find evidence for the null hypothesis of a negative impact of US VC investment on Swedish companies' performance. In fact, there are positive employment, sales, profitability, and foreign subsidiary effects, even after controlling for endogeneity. There is no effect on average pay, however, managerial pay increases in the long-term. There is no causal impact of US VC investment on exits or new funding rounds. Overall, these findings suggest that foreign VC investments benefit domestic companies' growth.
Further results
Results from the full sample
11
So far, our analysis compares US VC investments to non-US VC investments conditional on the companies receiving some VC investment. There is also an argument to compare companies that receive US VC investments against companies not funded by VCs. For this we use the full power of the SCRO data which contains all Swedish companies, what we call the full sample. We thus examine the impact of receiving investments either from US VCs or non-US VCs, against the default case of not receiving any investments from VCs. One limitation of this approach is that we can only run OLS regressions. This is because our instruments are only valid for receiving US VC investment, but not for non-US VC investment. Table 8 reports results from company level OLS regressions. In addition to the usual USVC dummy, we now include a non-USVC dummy variable indicating VC investment from non-US VCs. Again, we find a strong positive association of USVC and employment over a fiveyear horizon, with an implied effect size between 34% and 50% (Panel A). Coefficients for non-USVC are smaller with an implied effect size between 20% and 22%, and significant only over a one-to two-year horizon. The coefficients for sales are again much higher for USVC than non-USVC, although the USVC coefficient is only significant for the 2-and 3-year horizon, and the non-USVC variable is never significant (Panel B). The coefficients for profitability are very similar for USVC and non-USVC, all negative, and many of them significant (Panel C). Panel D shows results for foreign subsidiaries. The USVC coefficients are invariably higher and more significant. We caution once more that since we cannot control for endogeneity, these results should not be interpreted in a causal manner.
Results for local spill-overs
The public policy debate about foreign capital is not merely concerned with the effect of foreign investments on target companies, but also with their effect on local economic growth. To examine such spill-over effects, we consider all other companies operating in the same area and industry that do not receive VC investments. For this we can collapse the full sample from the company-year to the municipality-industry-year level and calculate dependent and control variables using only companies that never receive VC investments during our sample period.
The USVC variable now captures whether at least one company in a municipality-industry received US VC investment in a given year. Similarly, non-USVC now indicates whether companies in a municipality-industry received any non-US VC investment in a given year. In addition, we find a strong positive association with the number of new start-ups (Panel B).
The effect is roughly two-and-a-half as large for USVC. These results suggest that non-US VC investments are associated with stronger local employment growth and entrepreneurship, and that the effects are even bigger for USVCs.
We repeat the local spill-overs analysis in the VC sample. Specifically, we examine the effect of at least on company receiving US VC investments on other companies in the same area and industry that never receive VC investments during our sample period. The results are similar to the ones from the spill-over analysis in the full sample. There is positive, albeit weaker, association with employment (Panel C) and a strong positive association with the number of new start-ups (Panel D).
Overall, these results suggest a positive relationship between VC investments and other companies that operate in the same geography and industry, most notably other companies' employment and the number of new start-ups. Again, we note that in the absence of an instrument, we cannot not infer causality here.
Further robustness
In addition to the various robustness tests already mentioned, we now address several additional robustness checks.
First, we ask whether there are differences between US and other foreign investors. In the appendix we report results from regressions that distinguish three types of foreign investors:
US VCs, Nordic VCs, and rest-of-world (ROW) VCs. We re-run all VC sample regressions and only report OLS regression as the instruments are not suitable for the additional types of foreign investors (Tables A5 -A8 ). The inclusion of these other foreign VCs does not have a material effect on the US VC coefficients. The effect of Nordic and ROW VCs on employment is weaker. Many of their coefficients are in fact insignificant, although there are a few 13 interesting findings. ROW VCs are associated with more sales, Nordic VCs with more foreign subsidiaries, more new funding rounds, and a lower likelihood of failure.
Our main specification compares US VC investments against a default of observations where companies either received no investments, or investments from non-US VCs. As a robustness we consider narrowing down our sample to the round level, so that the default is only observations where companies received investments from non-US VCs. The advantage of such a round-to-round sample is a sharper comparison of the impact of receiving VC investments with and without US VC investors. The disadvantage is a reduction of the sample size by almost 75%, potentially weakening the statistical significance of the results. Again, our instruments are highly relevant, and we fail to reject the null of all instruments being exogenous (Table   A9) . Similarly, the F-statistic from the test for excluded instruments is well above the conventional threshold of 10 and alleviates any weak instrument concerns. Results for the company level regressions using the VC sample hold with significance and effect sizes of similar magnitude (Tables A10 -A12 ).
Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence to a long-standing policy debate about whether foreign investors benefit the local economy. We specially look at the role of US VC investors in Swedish start-up companies. We find that US VC investments result in higher employment, both at the company level and the level of the local economy. The empirical model controls for endogenous selection using well-established instrumental variable approaches. Overall the evidence rejects the notion that US VCs stunt the domestic growth of Swedish start-ups.
Our paper invites several avenues for further research. We are only able to measure the domestic growth of companies, so an interesting outstanding question is whether there are systematic differences in their non-domestic growth. A natural conjecture is that US VC investments would lead to growth in the US activities of the investment companies. The natural logarithm of one plus the number of employees of a company in a given year. To limit the effect of outliers the variable is winsorized at the 95% percentile. Data comes from the Swedish Companies Registrations Office (SCRO) which keeps track of all limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and private. Average pay Total wage costs divided by the number of employees of a company in a given year. To limit the effect of outliers the variable is winsorized at the 5% and 95% percentiles. Data comes from the SCRO which keeps track of all limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and private.
Managerial pay
The natural logarithm of board and CEO salary of a company in a given year. To limit the effect of outliers the variable is winsorized at the 95% percentile. Data comes from the SCRO which keeps track of all limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and private. Sales
The natural logarithm of one plus sales of a company in a given year.
To limit the effect of outliers the variable is winsorized at the 95% percentile. Data comes from the SCRO which keeps track of all limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and private. Profitability EBIT scaled by the average of beginning-and end-of-period total assets of a company in a given year. To limit the effect of outliers the variable is winsorized at the 5% and 95% percentiles. 3,197,337 2,797,972 2,431,286 2,093,973 1,788,386 This This table reports the results of municipality-industry level regressions. Panels A and B report employment and new start-up regressions in the full sample, respectively. The dependent variable is shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variables of interest are USVC (dummy variable indicating the presence of a US VC investor) and non-USVC (dummy variable indicating a funding round without US VC investors). Panels C and D report employment and new start-up regressions in the VC sample, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC. In all specifications, we include the macroeconomic and period fixed effects control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well   28 as lagged employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1 . T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. This table reports the full OLS employment regression output of company level regressions using the VC sample. The dependent variable is shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1 . T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. This table reports the full 2SLS second stage employment regression output of company level regressions using the VC sample. The dependent variable is shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. USVC is instrumented with the variables listed in Panel B of Table 1 . We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1 . T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Table 1 . T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Appendix
